Such was the May Revolution, the baptism of Argentine nationality: an apparently incoherent and confusing movement, devoid of a clear and well-defined directive idea, but in reality very rich in developments and above all singularly intelligent. It would suffice to prove it, if there were no other reasons, the fact that all the other South American revolutions, originating from the events in Spain, were dominated, and only later could they regain their momentum: only the Argentine one maintained from the first moment, and widened immediately, his conquests. Certainly, it cannot be said that the men of May 22 and 25 had a real doctrine to apply, nor can it be said that the republican idea was precisely the one they cherished: the most intelligent of them, Moreno, who was from him. English defined as “the Burke of South America”, he slowly passed from the monarchical conception to the frankly democratic and republican one: so much so that it is not possible to say with certainty whether, in May 1810, he was still a monarchist, as Alberti claims, or already a republican, as he seeks to prove the Levene. If the thought of the eldest among those men appears confused to us, it is easy to think how in the others it must have been even more obscure. Despite this, or perhaps precisely for this reason, the revolution ended up triumphing across the board, meaning by triumph the rapid conquest of the Creole masses, not only in the capital, and on the coasts, where the mentality, for contact with foreigners, was more flexible and capable of readily assimilating new ideas, but also in the provinces of the interior, where the populations were traditionalistic and misoneistic. It has been noted, by the most acute historian of those events, Levene, that the council of May 25th never blatantly boasted of having carried out a revolution, it limited itself to making believe that it had replaced an imbecile viceroy, always made use of the name of Ferdinand VII as legitimate sovereign. It remains unclear whether that attitude was spontaneous or was a very clever political move; but the fact is certain that that attitude, or tactics as it was, made the revolution triumph. In the first place, the populations of the interior, whose contribution might have been doubted at first, had plenty of time to get used to the idea of a change of government; secondly, and above all, the great danger that the another viceroy and the governors of the rest of South America could muster their forces and quickly crush the incipient movement. Instead the junta, with voluntary or involuntary deception, had the possibility of preparing a militia, which was then the unbreakable shield of the revolutionary conquests.
According to ezinesports.com, while Moreno and Belgrano, obeying their intellectualistic predilections, thought of equipping the town with cultural institutes (Moreno founded the library and popular schools, Belgrano the mathematics academy) and were waiting to prepare important economic reforms, the army national team was beginning to take shape and take action. The arming of the volunteers was carried out with spontaneous donations from citizens: and those offered by the poor classes determined the sincere emotion of Moreno (who in the meantime had founded the Gaceta de Buenos Aires, and he came there by publishing articles on the next congress and on the independence and constitution of the state, taking English freedoms as a model). Fifteen hundred volunteers, commanded first by Ortiz de Ocampo, and then by Balcarce, after having tamed the Spanish reaction that started from Córdoba, and led by the unfortunate Liniers, obtained, gradually increasing in number, the great victory of Suipacha (7 November 1810) on the royal troops: Upper Peru rose up, and Buenos Aires sent Castelli as commissioner, energetic, very active, fanatic, who had the leaders of the Spanish resistance executed: Nieto, Córdoba and Sanz. Another expedition to Paraguay was led by Belgrano, a man of thought rather than of war; but he had to retire after the unfortunate fight of Paraguary. Nevertheless, soon Paraguay was also rising, deposed the governor Velazco and constituted a government junta, which then, after various events, would be transformed into the long dictatorship, or rather tyranny, of Dr. France.
Meanwhile, in the Buenos Aires junta, two parties were increasingly emerging: the conservative one, personified by the Saavedra, and the democrat, of which Moreno was the soul. The arrival of the deputies of the provinces precipitated things: these, for the act of May 25th, would have had to meet in congress, but for an imprecise circular of the following 27th they had to be incorporated into the junta. Moreno was firmly opposed to the second solution, fearing the federalist spirits of the provincials, and wanted the provision of 25 to be respected; and when the incorporation took place, all he had to do was submit his resignation.